by
Magesan, ArvindI study identication of games of incomplete information, both static and dynamic, when
there are multiple equilibria in the data. In the case of static games, I show that if multiplicity
disappears at a small subset of the support of the observables, payos are identied. All the
equilibria of the model are also then identied. As payo relevant unobservables are an alternative
explanation to multiple equilibria for observed correlation in player actions conditional
on observables, I allow for this type of variable and show that as long as a conditional exclusion
restriction on the distribution of the unobservables is satised, payos, equilibria and the
distribution of the payo relevant unobservable are identied. Additionally, letting A be the
number of choice alternatives, N the number of players and K the number of equilibria, as long
as AN K, I show that equilibrium selection probabilities are also identied, a result that is
useful for considering the eects of counterfactual experiments in the presence of multiple equilibria.
I extend the framework to study identication in dynamic games. The static approach
extends in a straightforward way to nite horizon (non-stationary) games, but not to the more
common case of innite horizon (stationary) games. I show that by making additional testable
restrictions on the transition probabilities, a large class of stationary dynamic games are also
identied.
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