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Publications - 2008


 

A History of the Canadian Economy, Fourth Edition

Emery, Herbert, Norrie, Kenneth and Owram, Douglas
 

An Analysis of the Economic Effects of Withholding Taxes on Cross-Border Income Flows for Canada, Research Report for the Advisory Panel on Canada's System of International Taxation

McKenzie, Kenneth James
 

An 'Oil'igopoly Theory of Exploration

Boyce, John and Vojtassak, Lucia
 

Child Health Insurance Coverage: A Survey among temporary and permanent residents in Shanghai

Lu, Mingshan, Jing, Zhang, Jin, Ma, Bing, Li and Quan, Hude
 

Conglomerate Mergers

Church, Jeffrey Robert in Issues in Competition Law and Policy

This chapter provides an overview of the economics of conglomerate mergers, with a focus on the potential for an increase in its product portfolio to lead to conduct that is anticompetitive. The economics of portfolio power indicates that a conglomerate merger that results in a firm posttransaction having a larger portfolio or product range may have the ability and incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct. The key question for enforcement is how and whether to identify transactions that might give rise to an anticompetitive effect because of portfolio power, especially since most such transactions will be procompetitive. The chapter traces the evolution of conglomerate enforcement policy in the United States and Europe and considers the appropriateness of current enforcement policy

 

Consumer Preferences and Demand Systems

Barnett, William A. and Serletis, Apostolos
 

Cost structure and capacity utilisation in multi-product industries: an application to the Basque trawl industry

Lazkano, Itziar
 

Cross-country analysis of movie piracy

Walls, W. D.

We examine the rate of motion-picture piracy across a sample of 26 diverse countries. The level of piracy is explained empirically by the level of income, the cost of enforcing property rights, the level of collectivism present in a country's social institution and the level of internet usage. The results of a cross-country regression analysis indicate that piracy is increasing in the level of social coordination and the cost of enforcing property rights, unrelated to income and decreasing in internet usage.

 

Cross-country analysis of movie piracy

Walls, W. D.
 

Differential Grading Standards and Student Incentives

Eaton, B. Curtis and Mukesh Eswaran
 

“Economic Outcomes of Adult Education and Training”

Ferrer, Ana in International Encyclopaedia of Education, third edition
 

Economics of Motion Pictures

Walls, W. D. in L. Blume and S. Durlauf The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
 

"Education, Credentials and Immigrant Earnings"

Ferrer, Ana and Craig, Riddell
 

From A National, Centrally Planned Health System To A System Based On The Market: Lessons From China

Ma, Jin, Lu, Mingshan and Quan, Hude
 

Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities

Church, Jeffrey Robert, Gandal, N. and Krause, D.
 

Interregional Price Difference in the New Orleans Auction Market for Slaves

Choo, Eugene and Eid, Jean
 

Measuring Tax Incentives for R&D

McKenzie, Kenneth James
 

Myopic Deterrence Policies and the Instability of Equilibria

Wen, Jean-Francois and Eaton, B. C.
 

Natural gas and electricity markets

Walls, W. D.

The natural gas and electric power industries---once the classic examples of natural monopoly---are increasingly being regulated by market forces instead of public service commissions. The emergence of markets in the North American natural gas industry in the mid-1980s resulted largely from the failure of regulation, and a consequence of this regulatory failure was the separation of the energy commodity from its transportation. This simple change in the organization---where the energy commodity was unbundled from its transmission---provides the basis for restructuring natural gas and electricity markets. The natural gas and electricity industries are being transformed so that they more closely resemble a commodity market than a public utility in the move toward market-oriented allocation mechanisms for production, transmission, and distribution.

 

Nominal Wage Contracts, Labor Adjustment Costs and the Business Cycle

Janko, Zuzana
 

"On Hyperbolic Discounting in Energy Models: An Application to Natural Gas Allocation in Canada,"

Rowse, John
 

Productivity Trends in U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the NQ and AIM Cost Functions

Feng, Guohua and Serletis, Apostolos
 

Prosperity without conflict

Gonzalez, Francisco M. and Neary, Hugh M.
 

Public Finance in Canada, 3rd edition

Wen, Jean-Francois, H. Rosen and T. Snoddon
 

Redistribution and Entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian Growth

Wen, Jean-Francois and Garcia-Penalosa, C.
 

Reexamination of Real Business Cycles in A Small Open Economy

Janko, Zuzana and Guo
 

SFMN Incentives Project: Joint Management of Forest Ecosystems

Wilman, Elizabeth Anne, Hamed Kaddoura, Leo Amorim and Irviing Rosales
 

“Shadow Value Measure of Energy Efficiency Changes: An Empirical Analysis for U.S. Industrial Sectors, 1958-2000”

Khademvatani, Asgar
 

• “Should Workers Care about Firm Size?”

Ferrer, Ana and Stephanie Lluis
 

Socialists, Populists, Resources and the Divergent Development of Alberta and Saskatchewan

Emery, Herbert and Kneebone, Ronald D.
 

The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All

Hollis, Aidan and Pogge, Thomas
 

The Premier versus the Aristocrat: Francis Hincks, John G. Vansittart and Voters in the Oxford-General Election of 1851

Emery, Herbert
 

The Promise and Potential of Water Pricing Reforms

Ayoo, Collins A. and Horbulyk, Ted
 

Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect

Taylor, M. Scott and Levinson, Arik
 

Vertical Mergers

Church, Jeffrey Robert in Issues in Competition Law and Policy

This chapter provides an overview of the economics of vertical mergers. The overview strongly supports, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, a presumption that vertical mergers are welfare enhancing and good for consumers. However, vertical mergers can be anticompetitive if they result in either foreclosure or enhanced coordination. The difficult challenge for enforcement policy is effectively distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive transactions. The economics of vertical mergers can provide a basis for this distinction and thus inform optimal enforcement policy and the nature of vertical merger enforcement guideline

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